

# Taliban Government and Its Efforts for Global Recognition

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## Abstract

*This paper attempts to analyze the efforts of the Taliban government for the recognition of its government through diplomatic processes and bilateral and multilateral engagements with other states. The mention of governments under international law has no specific rules and regulations. Still, the states worldwide recognize a government according to their previous policies towards the group, now ruling, and national interests. Furthermore, some principles like legality and affective rule exist, among others, that are often considered preconditions for the recognition of the government. In the case of Afghanistan, countries around the world have put forward some conditions like civil liberties, women's education, inclusive government, and prevention of the Afghan soil being used for international terrorism. Despite all these factors, the Taliban government is trying to engage foreign states officially and receive formal recognition. They had some engagements even before they were in government and when the Doha peace process was underway with countries like Pakistan, China, and Qatar. After their takeover of Kabul, they initiated a rapid process of foreign engagements and strived hard to establish formal relations with other states. Despite their worries and reservations, countries around the world, even the US-led countries, have informal political and economic engagements with the Taliban but are "waiting" for the right time to recognize their government as legitimate. The paper is primarily qualitative and contributes to the understanding and knowledge regarding Afghanistan and the Taliban government.*

**Keywords:** Taliban, Recognition of the Government, Afghanistan, International Relations.

## Introduction

This paper intends to investigate the efforts of the new government in Kabul to be recognized as legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. Nations worldwide have informal engagements with the Taliban government, like financial and humanitarian help. However, they have not been perceived by any world country as legitimate. Since taking power in August, the Taliban have over and over communicated the assumption that the international community will perceive their position as the new government of Afghanistan and have found a few procedural ways to seek recognition. However, the gathering has yet to be eager to meet the circumstances Western powers and other states set forward. Global recognition would give the Taliban legitimacy to proceed with its standard over Afghanistan and could eliminate conciliatory obstructions to drawing in essential money and venture bargains from abroad. As Afghanistan's security and humanitarian circumstances keep weakening, the Taliban has a substantially more troublesome errand in persuading the global community to stretch out conventional recognition to the government (Schulz, 2023).

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While a large number of political and financial commitments with the Taliban could propose that a few nations — specifically Afghanistan's neighbors — are preparing to recognize the group formally, all things considered, keeping a formal presence in Afghanistan best serves the international strategy, security, and monetary plans of these nations. During the September 2021 Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan illustrated three pre-necessities for proper recognition of the Taliban government, including laying out an inclusive government, perceiving common liberties, and keeping viciousness from gushing out over the boundary. More than a year after the fact, brutal disagreements along the joint line with Pakistan, a breakdown in fundamental liberties across the country, and fear-monger bunches effectively working inside the nation have hampered the Taliban's desires to earn formal respect even from neighboring states (Standish, 2022).

On August 15, 2021, the Taliban took over Kabul following a weeks-long struggle against the Afghan government in which they held onto control of key urban communities and territories in the country. The elected President Ghani has since escaped Afghanistan, and the Taliban reported another administration on September 7. No State has yet recognized the Taliban as the legitimate authority of Afghanistan. Because they do not want to be seen as the first nation to give the Taliban legitimacy, some appear to be taking a "waiting" approach. Were the Taliban to merge their control and demonstrate the manageability of their standard, this might change. In the meantime, the different States are molding recognition regarding everyday freedoms, future political settlements, or confirmations against the militant organizations. The United States (US) and the Taliban reached an agreement during the Peace Process held in Qatar, paving the way for the complete withdrawal of US and other international forces from Afghanistan. This process not only brought an end to the US "War on Terror" in Afghanistan, which lasted for twenty years, but it also gave the Taliban the confidence they needed to take over Afghan territory by force rather than through an Afghan-led and supported intra-Afghan dialogue (Faheem & Khan, 2022).

This paper endeavors to investigate EIA's efforts to recognize its administration. The study takes direction from the hypothetical understandings of how recognition of government is perceived in International Law and how the states take recognition to a specific government. As referenced above, the recognition of a government is simply a political question in which states give recognition based on their foreign policy and stance about the arising bunch that, after a progressive battle, comes to govern the country. The recognition of EIA is likewise a political matter for the vast majority of the states. The new Kabul government's internal and external policies conditioned these states' recognition, neighboring and other states. Notwithstanding the way that few nations have casual communications with the Taliban, the gathering is battling for recognition of their government. Through components, for example, these, the Taliban has figured out how to lead the country's international concerns by partaking in multilateral gatherings, going to significant level strategic visits, and tolerating unfamiliar speculation, potentially opening doors from its financial accomplices without getting official recognition from any country (Schulz, 2023).

The qualitative study takes theoretical guidance from the existing literature on the recognition of the government in international law and international relations. This study analyses the efforts of the Taliban for recognition and official engagements with the international community. The study takes their visits, speeches, and official engagements through international conferences, summits, and bilateral meetings with the international community as the area of analysis. The following sections are about the theoretical understanding of how recognition is granted to governments and the government's efforts for recognition and responses from other countries.

### Recognition of Governments in International Law

Recognition shows the degree to which the perceiving party recognizes the perceived government in formal relations. About states, it shows the eagerness of the perceiving side to lay out or keep up with actual relations with the perceived government (Schuit, 2012). International law does not say how to recognize a government because each State can decide whether or not to do so. It needs to have clear guidelines in place. The main measures for perceiving a government are effective control and legitimacy, albeit a few States have generally chosen to nullify government recognition (Schuit, 2012). It is a significant decision of international law that each free State is qualified to be addressed in the global circle by an administration that is constantly complied with by the more significant part of the number of inhabitants in that State and which practices authority inside its domain. To deny a state that right is to question the state's independence. As a result, changes in the composition or form of government that occur in other nations typically do not concern states; Changes in that kind of government do not affect the state's international personality. The substitution of one government by one more is often joined by progressive disturbances as nationwide conflicts of contrasting levels of force and term, and by contending declarations of force concerning match specialists, outside states are habitually called upon to choose the inquiry which of the challenging group should be viewed just like the legitimate authority of the nation concerned; or on the other hand, after the threats have stopped, they might need to conclude whether the power which until further notice has victoriously championed itself over its rivals may appropriately be viewed as a government. To choose this nature is to recognize or decline to recognize the public government being referred to. When that administration appreciates, with a sensible possibility of permanency, the routine and however this is dubious willing compliance of the heft of the populace, outside States are legally obligated to remember it in that limit (Lauterpacht, 2016).

This view, known as the legitimate (as recognized from the political or discretionary) perspective on recognizing state-run administrations, must be recognized by and large. Numerous who keep up with those States, acting in their political carefulness and considering their political advantages, can deny recognition to an informal government of revolutionary beginning. Albeit a large portion of the time, changes interior to the State are not significant being referred to of recognition. Law generally does not distinguish between a revolutionary change in government and a constitutional one. Inside the State, the transformation permanently annihilates the congruity of the general set of laws; the previous regulation remains alive just to the extent that the new, revolutionary government embraces it. It is international law that protects the lawful congruity of the State. It does so by setting out the standard that the State and its commitments continue as before despite established or legislative changes, revolutionary or other (Kelsen, 1941). It implies that the question of recognition is simply a political matter for International Law and International Relations, even though states might have rules for the recognition of a government.

The idea of *effective* control is traditionally characterized to mean when authority is "adequately settled to give sensible confirmation of its perpetual quality, and of the passive consent of the people who comprise the state in its capacity to keep up with itself, and release its inner obligations and its outside commitments." It tends to be gotten from the guideline of regional respectability, which denies states from perceiving a power that is not in that frame of mind as the hindrance of one that is (Serralvo, 2006). An essential prerequisite is that the public authority be "free" in that it can practice independent power and have the ability to settle on its own choices without the impedance of unfamiliar entertainers. The authority should keep practicing power in a manner that forestalls the moving of force between contradicting parties each time one acquires the high

ground. Hence, robust control should be transitory as well as united. Some propose that controlling the capital city is a significant component of robust control. Albeit the capital city comes up short on legitimate importance, it is critical when recognition debates arise, and some contend that successful control is almost certainly checked by areas instead of the degree of the region taken care of. Thus, much might pivot, strategically and legitimately, over capital control (Philipp, 2006). The Taliban previously came to drive when they assumed command over Afghanistan on September 27, 1996, and continued to control the country until the Temporary Authority was laid out, with American help, in June 2002. In these years, they were just perceived as the public authority of Afghanistan by Pakistan, the Unified Middle Eastern Emirates, and Saudi Arabia despite the way that they were in successful control of 90% of Afghanistan's domain. Pakistan was the leading country to perceive public authority and, from that point forward, made steady attempts to get the Taliban the nation's seat at the UN (Tess & Goodman, 2021). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, recognized the Taliban to combat the expanding influence of Iran in the nation. Saudi Arabia suspended strategic relations after the Taliban chief Mullah Muhammad Omar would not surrender the Osama canister Loaded in August 1998. Notwithstanding the absence of recognition and absence of discretionary relations between the Taliban and the non-perceiving states, the Taliban framed the public authority of Afghanistan as of now under International Law. It is evident from the way that numerous researchers saw the US attack on Afghanistan in October 2001 as starting a worldwide violent struggle between the two states (Rubin, 2021).

The elected President Ghani has left the nation and is not guaranteeing he is still in control, and his assertions since leaving recognize the Taliban's accepted power and accord them obligation regarding administering the country. Amrullah Saleh, the First Vice-President under the Ghani Administration who claims to be the caretaker president under the constitution, and Ahmad Massoud, a prominent tribal leader and head of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, have both emerged as members of a resistance movement (Rana, 2021). Both have sought external support to resist the Taliban or force them to adopt a power-sharing arrangement.<sup>78</sup> It is still being determined whether they will offer any serious resistance to the Taliban. However, as it stands, a limited insurgency will not negate the adequate control criterion being fulfilled. Both have taken refuge in the Panjshir Valley, the exact location where the Rabbani regime was sheltered in the 1990s. Without a doubt, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken considered the Taliban the "true government" of Afghanistan before the House International Concerns Council on September 13,<sup>80</sup> showing a developing affirmation that they employ powerful command over the area, which is not hampered (presently) by a restricted obstruction. The EU, in its most recent goal, has likewise recognized that the Taliban is the accepted government with which functional commitment is fundamental; however, with which there will be no formal recognition (Toosi, 2021).

### **Quest for Recognition**

As a part of their declaration of senior figures to formal government posts, the Taliban selected Suhail Shaheen, a long-term individual from and previous representative for the group's political office in Qatar, to act as a diplomat to the United Nations. In press proclamations, they have more than once urged official consulates/diplomats to return to Kabul, including the US and European states. Additionally, the group has maintained a consistent pace of high-level diplomacy with regional states and neighboring countries, such as China, India, and Russia. Despite the battle for recognition, the Taliban guaranteed that the US was the greatest obstacle to the recognition.

"Taking everything into account, I think the US is the greatest hindrance," the Taliban representative Zabihullah Mujahid said when requested to make sense of his group's strategies to win recognition. Mujahid guaranteed that the Taliban had met "every one of the necessities" for their administration to be given formal recognition. He declared that all nations, including the US, should try to understand that political commitment with the Taliban is to "everybody's greatest advantage." It would permit the world to examine "the complaints" they have with the Taliban (Gul, 2022). Despite laying out close all-out command over Afghanistan since recovering power a half year prior, the Taliban have been battling to get international recognition for their administration amid a developing compassion and monetary emergency (Gul, 2022).

However, the group's leadership has been busy internationally for formal recognition. It has been meeting with authorities from the United Nations, who guaranteed the Taliban in 2021 that the body will proceed with its help programs in the country. Nonetheless, the UN turned down the Taliban's solicitation to have its delegate address the General Assembly. The group has also met with agents from the United Kingdom, who pushed them to guarantee that English nationals are permitted to leave the country. The UK additionally raised the issue of women's freedoms in meetings with Taliban agents (Thomas, 2021).

Since their 2011 appearance in Doha, the Taliban had held various immediate and roundabout discussions with delegates from various countries. Those endeavors were sloped up throughout recent years when they left on actual outings to Uzbekistan, Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, China, and Pakistan. When Iran discussed the Taliban's takeover of its eastern neighbor, it spoke in a cryptic tone even though Iran had been accused of supporting the group for a long time. At an August 28, 2021 discourse, Ali Khamenei said, "The idea of our relations with Taliban relies upon the idea of their relations with us." At the point when the neighbors did, at long last, meet in August 2021, it was to talk about the situation with the Islam Qala line crossing and exchange taxes (Kugelman, 2021). According to an anonymous former official who spoke with Al Jazeera, foreign governments accepting the Taliban as the legitimate government would go against diplomatic norms. Since assuming control over the country, the group's initiative has been mindful of taking a more manageable tone, frequently discussing press freedom, women's freedoms, and civil liberties.

Nonetheless, privileged gatherings and Afghans on the ground say Taliban troopers have been antagonistic and forceful towards the Afghan public. In the nation's major cities, Taliban fighters have been accused of torturing journalists and killing and abusing protesters in recent weeks. This adjustment of elements has likewise impacted the position of numerous nations towards the Taliban (Latifi, 2021).

As it continued looking for recognition, the Taliban government was helped by the Pakistan government by giving them a space in its foreign policy and meetings at international events. Suggestive of the 1990s, Pakistan has started to lead the pack on the subject of recognition for the Taliban system. Shah Mahmood Qureshi, the country's foreign minister, has urged interaction with the new government rather than its isolation. On September 21, State leader Imran Khan let the BBC know that Pakistan would perceive the new government as collaborating with Afghanistan's neighbors, alluding to an understanding that came to at the September 17 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) highest point in Dushanbe which Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan settled on three conditions for recognition. On the primary basis, it appears to be that the area will be governed inclusively by all the ethnic and religious groups. Khan clarified that the model does not incorporate orientation inclusivity, saying ladies' freedoms could not be forced outside Afghanistan. On the second and third focuses, hortatory responsibilities will be adequate.



Provided that this is true, formal recognition could happen rapidly. Whether SCO heavyweights China and Russia will adhere to these guidelines is a significant concern. Since August 15, both have engaged the Taliban in public and maintained their Kabul embassies, but Moscow recently indicated that international recognition needs to be immediately on the agenda (Olson, 2021).

Until 2022, the delegation had openly declared 135 discretionary meetings since dominating, with a few happening in multilateral settings. Turkey was associated with 22 gatherings, the most significant part of any country. Thirty-four nations have shown some degree of commitment with Taliban delegates, and proper recognition — that is, recognizing another system through hesitant demonstrations without making it qualified for a seat at the United Nations — has turned into an embracing the truth. On Walk 13, Turkish minister Mevlut Cavusoglu told the philanthropic guide alone cannot resolve Afghanistan's concerns and that nations should also offer discretionary recognition of the Islamic Emirate. The comment was conveyed about Turkey and Qatar purportedly approaching an arrangement with the Taliban to run the global air terminals in Kabul and different urban communities (Marie & Iqbal, 2022). The Antalya discussion additionally furnished the Taliban with valuable chances to exhibit the defrosting of its international detachment firsthand. During the event, Amir Khan Muttaqi, the country's foreign minister, met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It was the second leader to host Erdogan since he met Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan in November. The group also met with the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Qatar, Somalia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela in side meetings and discussed the issue of recognition (Zelin, 2022).

Additionally, the group met with the special representative of the United States for Afghanistan, Thomas West. Turkey was the only NATO nation to reopen its embassy in Kabul. Similarly, in July 2022, India reestablished a modest diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. The Indian government expressed that it would involve its resumed consulate in Kabul to protect Indian public safety amid developing worry about the overflow of savagery (Schulz, 2023).

In Tashkent, in July 2022, Uzbekistan gathered an international meeting on Afghanistan. Over 100 delegates from almost 30 nations went to the occasion to meet with the Taliban. Many states, particularly those from Central Asia, were plainly pushing toward possible relations with the new powers in Kabul. Amir Khan Muttaqi told the press that they met with all designations from almost 30 nations.

Around the same time, a social event of thousands of male political and ethnic leaders finished by asking international states to recognize their government as legitimate officially, yet made no signs of changes on global requests like the opening of young women's secondary schools. "We ask local and global nations, particularly Islamic nations ... to recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ... discharge all authorizations, thaw (national bank) assets and backing being developed of Afghanistan," This was an aggregate request to the global local area, Muslim world specifically, to perceive the public authority (Yawar, 2022).

As of recently, its chiefs have partaken in north of 375 discretionary gatherings with more than 30 nations. Afghan Acting Minister of International Affairs Amir Khan Muttaqi has ventured out to Turkey for the Antalya Policy Discussion, China for the Tunxi for an International Meeting, and Uzbekistan for the Tashkent International Conference. Afghanistan avoids diplomatic isolation thanks to the Taliban's frequent participation in bilateral and multilateral arrangements with its diplomatic partners. Strategic trades additionally advance components for exchange among nations and the Taliban to address local energy, monetary, and security concerns. It is now evident that about 14 nations have running embassies in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan (Schulz, 2023).

In addition, the Taliban reached their first international agreement with China since taking power. The Taliban signed a 25-year agreement with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company at the beginning of January 2023 to extract oil from Afghanistan's Amu Darya River basin with Chinese investment of more than \$500 million. The understanding likewise specified that the raw petroleum would be handled inside the nation, proposing that the Chinese organization could construct a treatment facility in Afghanistan. The understanding is possibly the most vital phase in a developing Chinese-Taliban monetary organization and could influence different nations to believe Afghanistan to be a feasible venture accomplice (Standish, 2021).

### **Challenges to Taliban Recognition**

China is particularly worried about the Taliban's consolation of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which it views as a dissident and Islamic radical power in Xinjiang Territory. Russia is concerned that the Taliban will give Chechen separatists and jihadists more strength and make it easier for terrorists to enter the Central Asian republics across the border. China, notwithstanding, is anxious to broaden the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to Afghanistan, favored by plentiful mineral assets and a door to energy-rich Central Asia and Russia. On July 10, 2021, the Taliban declared, "China is a cordial nation, and we invite it for recreation and creating Afghanistan. According to Holland, 2022, "China did not extend diplomatic recognition to the Taliban when they were in power from 1996 to 2001. Beijing, however, was to recognize the Taliban not only to gain access to its natural resources, including precious rare earth metals but also to gain an advantage in its geopolitical rivalry with the United States. There is an emerging consensus that humanitarian assistance should be independent of specific actions by the Taliban. It is evident in the recent issuance of additional licenses to allow more significant aid flows and increased humanitarian aid; however, the difficulty is channeling assets to the Afghan state to improve the enduring of the populace without legitimizing the Taliban government. In its territorial commitment, the U.S. ought to encourage the neighbors to stay joined in non-recognition and help out benefactors on the conveyance of compassionate guidance. If the neighbors in all actuality do officially perceive the Taliban, this could harm endeavors to consider the Taliban responsible on the basic administration, freedoms, and psychological warfare fronts. However, to the extent that the district has a helpful commitment with the Taliban in a manner that lines up with U.S. interests, this could act as a proving ground for boosting the Taliban to change its way of behaving (Bateman, 2021).

Concerning recognition of the new Taliban government in Afghanistan, the US-led states are mindful. They have three primary worries: a.) vital civil liberties, b.) the inclusive government, and c.), all the more significantly, the idea of their relations with worldwide militant organizations. The assertions of significant heads of this coalition point towards alertness in their methodology, and they understand that connecting the recognition of the Taliban government with their inner and outer direct according to their responsibilities in the nonaggression treaty is the practical arrangement to follow. This group of nations has stated that it is essential to engage with the Taliban, but it will not immediately recognize the Taliban government. The United Nations Secretary, during his visit to Islamabad, said in September 2021, "We would instead not recognize the Taliban as an administration. However, we truly see the significance of drawing in with them (Syed, 2021).

In any case, a few provokes keep on hindering the Taliban's capacity to achieve global recognition. The Taliban's choice to forbid women from going to college was met with distinct analysis from the United Nations. Unfamiliar clergy members from 11 nations, including Australia, Canada,

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the Unified Realm, joined the E.U. and the U.S. in criticizing the prohibition on female guide laborers. The ban would "come with consequences for the Taliban," according to the United States' announcement.

Indeed, even the Taliban's nearest conciliatory and financial accomplices, similar to a portion of Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors, have communicated an analysis of its standard. Because of the enormous extent of ethnic Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks living in Afghanistan, the Central Asian states are quick to see the Taliban assemble an inclusive government. In any case, these Groups have been met with cruel rule under the Taliban. In late 2021, Taliban authorities dislodged more than 1,000 ethnic Tajik and Turkmen from their homes. Moreover, ethnic Tajiks were effectively selected by Taliban contenders to join their positions. The shortfall of assurances for ethnic minorities in Afghanistan pollutes the Taliban's authenticity and frustrates Focal Asian nations from formally recognizing the Taliban (Dayal, 2023).

Furthermore, the Taliban is attempting to get control over terrorist organizations working inside Afghanistan appropriately. For instance, the Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP) is trying to overturn the Taliban-drove government in Kabul. At the same time, Islamabad has charged Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with involving Afghan land as an organizing justification for sending off assaults in Pakistan. To undermine the legitimacy of Taliban rule, ISKP has carried out numerous terrorist attacks on partners abroad. Six people, including two members of the Russian embassy staff, were killed in a suicide bombing sponsored by the ISKP outside the Russian embassy in Kabul on September 5, 2022. In December, two ISKP contenders went after the Pakistani representative to Afghanistan, Obaid your Rehman Nizamani, injuring his gatekeeper simultaneously. A multi-week after the fact, ISKP attackers designated a Kabul lodging frequently visited by Chinese nationals. Five Chinese nationals were harmed in the attack. Most recently, on January 11, 2023, an ISKP assault beyond the unfamiliar service working in Kabul killed five individuals (Jazeera, 2023).

The Taliban have found that ISKP makes it difficult for them to demonstrate their control over the internal security situation in Afghanistan. ISKP has targeted diplomatic offices in Afghanistan and fired rockets into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to establish a global caliphate. Unabated ISKP assaults against unfamiliar legislatures present in Afghanistan, similar to Russia, China, Pakistan, and the Focal Asian states, could discourage different nations from getting back to Kabul or putting resources into their economies. Directly following the psychological oppressor assault on the Kabul lodging, Chinese Envoy Wang Yu required the "Afghan break government to go areas of strength to steadfast lengths to guarantee the security of Chinese nationals, organizations, and ventures in Afghanistan."

Political brutality from terrorist organizations working in Afghanistan is spilling across the line into Pakistan. Following the proper finish to the truce between the TTP and Islamabad, the TTP has increased irregular assaults against regular citizens and military foundations across Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban consented to work with discussions between Islamabad and the TTP yet has been slippery in its job, liking to let the two locations know their issues. The Taliban's detachment to TTP assaults in Pakistan is souring relations with Islamabad and could be a calculation Pakistan's choice not to stretch out accurate recognition to the gathering (Maizland, 2023).

The Taliban's failure to address the security and financial worries of its accomplices will compound the pronounced problems tormenting Afghanistan. This way, Kabul's accomplices need more motivation to change business as usual. They are likely to keep drawing in with the Taliban government without bearing the cost of the proper recognition it wants. As the Taliban government



battles to address the genuine worries of its discretionary and financial accomplices, it will develop more troublesome in the future to accomplish international recognition.

## Conclusion

This paper attempted to analyze the struggle and attempts of the Taliban for the recognition of the government. Under the International Law, the matter of recognition of government is purely political. States recognize governments according to their own political stance and foreign policy. The Taliban government has consistently been involved in their struggle to gain international recognition. In the 1990s, the international scenario and global politics pushed some countries to recognize the previous government of the Taliban, but now, the international scenario is entirely different. Some states might want to have an official relationship with the Taliban, but none of them can initiate the process of recognition. Recognition of the Taliban would risk the country's image in the world as the group was consistently portrayed as a "terrorist" group, and its members were included in the Black list of terrorists. Some countries have conditioned the recognition to some measures that the Taliban have to fulfill. Among these conditions are the education of women, inclusive government, and elimination of terrorist groups like TTP and ISKP. The neighboring countries are expecting the Taliban to take measures that could protect their country from terrorists and the ethnic groups living in Afghanistan.

The Taliban has struggled hard since 2021 to get recognition. They participated in multi-lateral events and arranged bilateral engagements with several countries, including Turkey, Pakistan, and European countries.

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